Although it was only in the first half of the twentieth century that the term personalism became known as a designation of philosophical schools and systems, personalist thought had developed throughout the nineteenth century as a reaction to perceived depersonalizing elements in Enlightenment rationalism, pantheism, Hegelian absolute idealism, individualism as well as collectivism in politics, and materialist, psychological, and evolutionary determinism.

In its various strains, personalism always underscores the centrality of the person as the primary locus of investigation for philosophical, theological, and humanistic studies. It is an approach or system of thought which regards or tends to regard the person as the ultimate explanatory, epistemological, ontological, and axiological principle of all reality, although these areas of thought are not stressed equally by all personalists and there is tension between idealist, phenomenological, existentialist, and Thomist versions of personalism.

[ . . . ]

Personalists hold personhood (or “personality”) to be the fundamental notion, as that which gives meaning to all of reality and constitutes its supreme value. Personhood carries with it an inviolable dignity that merits unconditional respect. Personalism has for the most part not been primarily a theoretical philosophy of the person. Although it does defend a unique theoretical understanding of the person, this understanding is in itself such as to support the prioritization of moral philosophy, while at the same time the moral experience of the person is such as to decisively determine the theoretical understanding. . . . Stressing the moral nature of the person, or the person as the subject and object of free activity, personalism tends to focus on practical, moral action and ethical questions. (Continue)

(Via Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

The Debate Over Darwin Continues: Stephen Meyer vs. Michael Shermer in Beverly Hills

In less than two weeks we will witness the rematch of the decade as Stephen Meyer and Michael Shermer face off on the question of intelligent design versus evolution.

These two men have met several times before, most recently at Freedomfest in Las Vegas in 2008 (click here for video). They also sparred in 2005 at Westminster College and appeared together on Lee Strobel’s Faith Under Fire program (video here). It will be interesting to see the new insights into the questions at hand as this debate has matured and developed.

The debate is hosted by the American Freedom Alliance and will take place at the prestigious Saban Theater in Beverly Hills on Monday, November 30, at 7:30pm. Dr. Meyer and Dr. Shermer will be joined by Dr. Richard Sternberg and Dr. Donald Prothero, respectively.

For more information and to buy tickets, click here.

(Via Evolution News)

Here is audio of a debate of sorts between William Lane Craig and Daniel Dennett. Craig spends 45 minutes going over three theistic arguments in some detail: Leibnizian cosmological arguments, kalām cosmological arguments, and anthropic principle teleological arguments. Dennett responds for about 10 minutes. He seems impressed by Craig’s presentation, but objects that our intuitions (about causality for example) when taken to these conclusions, cease to be intuitive. I’m not sure that’s really relevant though, since the exposition of an intuition is never as obvious and clear as the intuition itself. At any rate, it’s obviously more plausible to affirm the principle of causality than to deny it.

He also objects to the claim that abstract objects do not stand in causal relations. He suggests they can in a sense, but the sense he describes is clearly formal causal relations. The claim is that they cannot stand in efficient causal relations, and so cannot be appealed to as efficient causes.

It ends with a couple of minutes of commentary by “Alister” who I assume is Alister McGrath since Craig’s CV includes “In Defense of Theistic Arguments” in the just-published The Future of Atheism: Alister McGrath and Daniel Dennett in Dialogue.

(HT Quodlibeta)

“The existentialist . . . finds it extremely embarrassing that God does not exist, for there disappears with Him all possibility of finding values in an intelligible heaven. There can no longer be any good a priori, since there is no infinite and perfect consciousness to think it. It is nowhere written that “the good” exists, that one must be honest or must not lie, since we are now upon the plane where there are only men. Dostoevsky once wrote: ‘If God did not exist, everything would be permitted’; and that, for existentialism, is the starting point. Everything is indeed permitted if God does not exist, and man is in consequence forlorn, for he cannot find anything to depend upon either within or outside himself. . . . Nor, on the other hand, if God does not exist, are we provided with any values or commands that could legitimise our behaviour. Thus we have neither behind us, nor before us in a luminous realm of values, any means of justification or excuse. – We are left alone, without excuse. That is what I mean when I say that man is condemned to be free.”

Jean Paul Sartre, “Existentialism Is a Humanism,” 1946

Buddhism: A Christian Exploration and Appraisal by philosophers Keith Yandell and Harold Netland, is an important contribution to Christian-Buddhist dialogue. Along with a concise but thorough overview of the history and beliefs of Buddhism, it provides an analysis and criticism of Buddhist doctrines from the perspective of Western analytic philosophy. Yet the authors’ tone is irenic, and their sensitivity to the cultural and ethnic aspects of Buddhism also contributes to the success of the book.

The authors spend the first three chapters tracing the historical development of Buddhism from India to China, Japan, and the West. The explanation of the doctrinal development/transformation from Theravada Buddhism to Mahayana Buddhism is insightful and helps the reader to not only understand the core teachings of the Buddha (The Four Noble Truths, impermanence, no-self, Nirvana, etc.), but also to grasp the adaptive nature of the religion. The authors demonstrate familiarity with a wide array of sources related to these topics. In charting the historical development of Buddhism, Yandell and Netland highlight the social and culture environments of the times that helped shaped Buddhism’s developments. This is particularly true in chapter 3 in regard to the Japanese effort to carry the dharma (Buddhist teaching) to the West. This chapter provides opportunities for readers to understand the Japanese mind, partly by explaining the close relationship between Japanese Buddhism and nationalism.

In chapters 4 and 5, the authors provide metaphysical analysis and criticism of the core doctrines of Buddhism. These two chapters (especially chapter 4) may prove challenging to readers who do not have a background in metaphysics. Nonetheless, the basic idea of each argument is clearly stated. What was most intriguing to me in these chapters is their analysis and criticism of impermanence, no-self, and dependent co-origination. Buddhism believes that “nothing . . . can exist independently. Any [existing] thing exists in mutual dependence on other things that . . . are essenceless” (121). In other words, there is no independent nature or essence. In addition, there is no enduring self, including souls and minds. For Buddhists, there is no concept of self, but simply “a collection of momentary states” (120). Naturally, such metaphysical claims raise questions for Christians who believe in enduring souls, minds, and selves.

In chapter six, the authors examine Buddhist teachings in the light of specifically Christian belief. Although there are some similarities between Christianity and Buddhism, “the basic differences between the two visions of reality and how we are to live” are un-reconcilable. For example, Christianity affirms theism, while Buddhism rejects it, and the Christian concepts of sin and final judgment are absent from Buddhist teaching. Further, for Buddhism, “the core religious disease is the occurrence of unsatisfactory states in collections” (180), while for Christianity it is our sin. The cure for the disease in Buddhism is enlightenment—detachment from anything in the world—but for Christianity, it is repentance. Thus, the authors conclude, “The Buddha or the Christ? The dharma or the gospel? These are not simply variations on a common theme, or different ways of expressing the same spiritual insight. The choice here is between two radically different perspectives on reality, on the nature of the human predicament, and the way to overcome it” (212).

Having been raised in a Buddhist culture, I found this book to be enlightening and challenging. I grew in my understanding of Buddhist beliefs, and also recognized interesting parallels between Buddhism and Christianity, which I believe reflect God’s common grace. Yandell and Netland’s skillful introduction to and analysis of Buddhism will not disappoint anyone who seeks a critical but fair Christian engagement with this influential religion.

- Reviewed by Naomi Noguchi Reese

* Kind thanks to Adrianna at InterVarsity Press for this review copy.

Feminist epistemology is an outgrowth of both feminist theorizing about gender and traditional epistemological concerns. Feminist epistemology is a loosely organized approach to epistemology, rather than a particular school or theory. Its diversity mirrors the diversity of epistemology generally, as well as the diversity of theoretical positions that constitute the fields of gender studies, women’s studies, and feminist theory. What is common to feminist epistemologies is an emphasis on the epistemic salience of gender and the use of gender as an analytic category in discussions, criticisms, and reconstructions of epistemic practices, norms, and ideals. While feminist epistemology is not easily and simply characterized, feminist approaches to epistemology tend to share an emphasis on the ways in which knowers are particular and concrete, rather than abstract and universalizable. Feminist epistemologies take seriously the ways in which knowers are enmeshed in social relations that are generally hierarchical while also being historically and culturally specific. In addition, feminist epistemologies assume that the ways in which knowers are constituted as particular subjects are significant to epistemological problems such as warrant, evidence, justification, and theory-construction, as well as to our understanding of terms like “objectivity,” “rationality,” and “knowledge.”

(Via Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Branch of philosophy concerned with the analysis of what human beings do intentionally. This typically includes an effort to distinguish actions from mere events and some proposal concerning the ethical significance of actions. Understanding the relation between choice or volition and the performance of an action, for example, has been taken to be crucial for the ascription of moral responsibility to those who act.

(Via Philosophical Dictionary)

Philosopher Bradley Monton’s new book Seeking God in Science: An Atheist Defends Intelligent Design is now available.  The publisher’s website gives this description:

The doctrine of intelligent design is often the subject of acrimonious debate. Seeking God in Science cuts through the rhetoric that distorts the debates between religious and secular camps. Bradley Monton, a philosopher of science and an atheist, carefully considers the arguments for intelligent design and argues that intelligent design deserves serious consideration as a scientific theory.

Monton also gives a lucid account of the debate surrounding the inclusion of intelligent design in public schools and presents reason why students’ science education could benefit from a careful consideration of the arguments for and against it.

Douglas Groothuis provides an endorsement:

“Seeking God in Science is a refreshing and fair-minded exploration of intelligent design arguments. Unlike the many ideologically-driven detractors of intelligent design, Monton refuses to set up a straw man, poison the well, or dismiss it as unscientific. Bradley Monton writes as “a friendly atheist”—one who seriously and honestly considers claims that challenge atheism. As such, this book is a welcome breakthrough.”– Douglas Groothuis, Professor of Philosophy, Denver Seminary

Dr. Monton was the moderator of the recent Craig-Ayala debate, available to download here (MP3).

“No scientific theory touches on the mysteries that the religious tradition addresses. A man asking why his days are short and full of suffering is not disposed to turn to algebraic quantum field theory for the answer. The answers that prominent scientific figures have offered are remarkable in their shallowness. The hypothesis that we are nothing more than cosmic accidents has been widely accepted by the scientific community. Figures as diverse as Bertrand Russell, Jacques Monod, Steven Weinberg, and Richard Dawkins have said it is so. It is an article of their faith, one advanced with the confidence of men convinced that nature has equipped them to face realities the rest of us cannot bear to contemplate. There is not the slightest reason to think this so.”

– David Berlinski, The Devil’s Delusion: Atheism and Its Scientific Pretensions, xvi

In the ethical thought of such existentialist writers as Sartre and Heidegger, abandonment is the awareness that there are no external sources of moral authority. No deity, for example, provides us with guidance or direction; we achieve an authentic life by depending only on ourselves.

(Via Philosophical Dictionary)

One inevitable consequence of this approach to morality is well described by Aldous Huxley, author of Brave New World.

For myself as, no doubt, for most of my contemporaries, the philosophy of meaninglessness was essentially an instrument of liberation.  The liberation we desired was simultaneously liberation from a certain political and economic system and liberation from a certain system of morality.  We objected to the morality because it interfered with our sexual freedom.

Aldous Huxley, Ends and Means: An Inquiry into the Nature of Ideals and into the Methods Employed for Their Realization (New York: Harper & Bros., 1937), 316.

It turns out to be convenient in many cases that life has no ultimate meaning:  It’s the ideal excuse to fashion a morality that suits one’s individual whims.  Objective meaning and purpose can prevent one from doing things one is inclined to do.  As a result, such things are ignored, attacked, or reinterpreted.  But they never quite go away.